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RATING THE RATERS: RESTORING CONFIDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Ryan Voorhees*
The recent financial crisis has caused long-term damage and lasting effects to the global financial system. Credit rating agencies contributed
to the boom by giving their highest ratings to poorly understood new financial instruments. During this time, they lacked accountability or oversight,
and they suffered from intense conflicts of interest. The U.S. and E.U. have
recently enhanced regulatory power in this area, but they should explore
additional options at both the international and national level, including
adopting an international advisory board or creating public rating agencies.
“From 2000 to 2007, Moody’s rated 45,000 mortgage securities as
AAA. In the beginning of [2010], there were six U.S. companies with that
rating. In 2006, it gave its stamp of approval to some 30 such securities
each and every working day. The results were disastrous. None of what
happened was an act of God. The greatest tragedy would be to accept the
idea that no one could have seen this crisis coming and thus, nothing could
have been done. If we accept this notion, it will happen again.”1
“Everything was investment grade. It didn’t really matter.”2
“[N]obody gives a straight answer about anything around here . . . . [H]ow
about we come out with new [rating criteria] and actually have clear cut
parameters on what the hell we are supposed to do.”3
*
Executive Articles Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law; J.D.,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Dickinson College, 2007. The
author would like to thank his faculty advisor, Professor Daniel D. Ujczo, for his invaluable
feedback and assistance. The author would also like to thank his parents for their constant
support.
1
Phil Angelides, Chairman, Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Press Event on the Release of
the Final Report of the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 4–5 (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-news/2011-01-27-FCIC-Press-ConferenceTranscript.pdf.
2
Hearing on Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. Ex.1b (2010).
3
Id. at Ex.1c.
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I. INTRODUCTION
These are tumultuous times for global financial markets. In 2007
and 2008, severe financial disruptions nearly collapsed the global economy
and caused a worldwide crisis. In the wake of the crisis, millions of
individuals found themselves unemployed, and trillions of dollars of wealth
had evaporated.4 Many believe that the crisis was avoidable and was caused
by widespread failures in financial regulation.5 Thus, policymakers and
regulators worldwide now confront the formidable challenge of restoring
confidence in markets and formulating long-term responses to the crisis.
The past few years bore witness to countless reports and studies that
sought to identify and analyze potential sources of the crisis.6 Most
conclude that, in part, credit rating agencies (CRAs) played a role in and
exacerbated the crisis.7 Studies focus primarily on the ratings that CRAs
assigned to the many of the exotic financial instruments at the heart of the
recent crisis: asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, credit

4

See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
xv–xvi (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (noting that in the U.S., the effects included the
unemployment of twenty-six million Americans and the loss of $11 trillion of household
wealth).
5
Id. at xvii.
6
See, e.g., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE (2011) [hereinafter WALL STREET REPORT]; FCIC REPORT, supra note 4.
7
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at xxv (concluding that CRAs were “essential cogs in
the wheel of financial destruction” whose ratings “help[ed] the market soar” and later
“wreaked havoc across markets and firms.”). “So matters stood in 2007, when the machine
that had been humming so smoothly and so lucratively slipped a gear, and then another, and
another—and then seized up entirely.” Id. at 212.

File: Voorhees 2

2012]

Created on: 6/7/2012 2:45:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/1/2012 6:08:00 PM

RATING THE RATERS

877

default swaps, and structured investment vehicles.8 While investments with
the highest ratings (AAA or Aaa) have traditionally defaulted at only a 1%
rate, these complex, novel instruments—many of which enjoyed AAA or
Aaa ratings before the crisis—defaulted or lost value at an alarming rate.9
The result was “a loss of investor confidence in the value of the AAA rating, in the holdings of major U.S. financial institutions, and even in the
viability of U.S. financial markets.”10
The vast majority of ratings worldwide come from the three largest
CRAs: Moody’s Corporation, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch Ratings
(collectively, the “Big Three”).11 These three companies have, for some
time, dominated the credit rating industry.12 Thus, the Big Three are at the
center of the inquiry into CRA regulation and are the focus of this Note.
Part II highlights some recurring criticisms leveled against the CRAs in
recent years, especially against the Big Three. Part III reviews domestic and
foreign approaches to CRA oversight in the wake of the recent crisis. Part
IV presents alternative regulatory structures that could help restore
worldwide confidence and accountability in CRAs.

8

An asset-backed security is a “financial security backed by a loan, lease or receivable[]
against assets other than real estate and mortgage-backed securities.” Asset-Backed SecurityABS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asset-backedsecurity.asp (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012). A collateralized debt obligation is a “security backed by a pool of
bonds, loans and other assets.” Collateralized Debt Obligation, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). A credit default
swap is “a swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between
parties.” Credit Default Swap, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/credit
defaultswap.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). A structured investment vehicle is “a pool of
investment assets that attempts to profit from credit spreads between short-term debt and
long-term structured finance products. . . .” Structured Investment Vehicle, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/structured-investment-vehicle.asp (last visited Mar. 20,
2012).
9
WALL STREET REPORT, supra note 6, at 243.
10
Id.
11
See HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 68 (2008).
12
Id. Although CRAs play a central role in today’s economy, they come from relatively
humble beginnings. The use of credit ratings for market securities began in 1909 when John
Moody first published Moody’s Analysis of Railroad Investments to rate railroad stocks and
bonds. Moody’s History: A Century of Market Leadership, MOODY’S CORP., http://v3.
moodys.com/Pages/atc00 1.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). John Fitch founded the Fitch
Publishing Company in 1913, and Poor’s Publishing rated its first corporate bond in 1922.
See About Us of Fitch Ratings, FITCH GROUP, http://www.fitchratings.com/web/en/dynamic
/about-us/about-us.jsp (last visited Feb. 10, 2012); see also A History of Standard & Poor’s,
STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-sp/timeline/en/us/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM’S FLAWS
Academics, politicians, and others have repeatedly criticized CRAs,
especially the Big Three, in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Their
complaints generally relate to (1) the intense conflicts of interest that
pervade the industry-standard “issuer-pays” model used by CRAs; (2) the
lack of accountability that CRAs face regarding rating errors and the market
turmoil that they create; and (3) the immense power that CRAs wield as a
result of the deep connection between their work and banking, real estate,
and insurance laws. This Section examines these problems.
A.

The “Issuer-Pays” Model

Historically, CRAs operated under a “subscriber-pays” model,
earning their revenues from paid subscribers.13 When a CRA rated a bond or
a company, the CRA would not freely publish the credit rating that it
assigned to the investment.14 Rather, investors paid a monthly fee to gain
access to lists of credit ratings of major companies and important bonds.15
By the 1970s, however, CRAs (including the Big Three)
experienced revenue shortfalls and began searching for alternative sources
of revenue.16 They determined that they could substantially increase profits
by shifting to an “issuer-pays” compensation model, which has now become
an industry standard.17 Under the issuer-pays model, companies—not paid
subscribers—themselves seek ratings and pay for the CRA services.18

13

See Carol Ann Frost, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research
Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, 22 J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN. 469, 478
(2007) (stating that the paid subscription model was employed until the 1970s).
14
See id. at 478–79.
15
See id. at 479.
16
See id. at 478–79 (concluding that another factor affecting the shift away from the subscription fee model was the advent of low-cost copy machines that enabled groups of subscribers to free-ride the system with a single subscription).
17
See id. at 479 (noting that the principal credit agencies began the trend towards the
“issuer-pays “model).
18
See id. (briefly describing the model and exploring related conflict of interest issues).
Today, the Big Three adhere to the issuer-pays model, and there are only a few subscriberbased companies, such as the Egan-Jones Rating Co. and Rapid Ratings International. These
companies currently play a very minor role in the market. See EGAN-JONES RATING CO.,
http://www.egan-jones.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012); About Us, RAPID RATINGS
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.rapidratings.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). Despite their
minor role, the 2008 financial crisis sharpened interest in these enterprises. Reforming Credit
Rating Agencies: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 76 (2009) (statement of James H. Gellert, Chairman and CEO, Rapid Ratings International, Inc.), available at http://financialservices.
house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/82.pdf.
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Supporters of the issuer-pays model contend that the Big Three
have implemented adequate measures to prevent or eliminate conflicts of
interest.19 They also argue that the issuer-pays model increases the public’s
access to information and ultimately lowers investment costs.20 Nonetheless,
it is widely believed that the issuer-pays system creates unacceptable
conflicts of interest in the rating industry.
Detractors contend that CRAs fail to operate objectively because
the issuer-pays system provides incentives for them to attract clients by
offering high—but often inaccurate—ratings.21 A Senate report notes that
former Moody’s and S&P employees have stated that before the crisis,
“gaining market share, increasing revenues, and pleasing investment
bankers . . . assumed a higher priority than issuing accurate [] credit
ratings.”22 Indeed, at that time relationships with issuers and investment
banks took on a higher priority than high quality research.23 Internal e-mails
suggest that managers at the Big Three were willing to adjust rating criteria
to enhance their market share.24 Likewise, a 2010 U.S. Senate investigation
confirmed that investment banks hired from the ranks of former CRA
employees based on those individuals’ knowledge of how to structure deals
to secure the highest credit ratings.25
Another conflict of interest arises when a CRA not only rates a
client’s credit, but also provides additional ancillary consulting services.26
These ancillary services typically include, among other things, services such
as scoring models, systems support, and empirical data reports.27
19

See WALL STREET REPORT, supra note 6, at 273 (stating that CRAs assured Congress of
their ability to manage conflicts of interest, although market pressures undermined the process and quality of credit ratings).
20
Roopa Kudva, Issuer-Pays Model Ensures Ratings are Available to the Entire Market,
ECON. TIMES (INDIA) (Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.
com/2010-05-06/news/27585572_1_rating-agencies-downgrades-issuer.
21
WALL STREET REPORT, supra note 6, at 272.
22
Id. at 273.
23
Id. at 274.
24
Hearing on Wall Street and the Financial Crisis, supra note 2, Ex.1b.
25
See Rich Blake, Sleeping with the Enemy – Rating Agency Conflicts Surface, ABCNEWS
(Apr. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ratings-agencies-chiefly-sp-moodys-fitchfire-bed/story?id=10481484. Unfortunately, this is a longstanding practice. Clifford L. Alexander, the former chairman of Moody’s, spent 19 years on the board of MCI Communications Corp. and later WorldCom, resigning a mere six months prior to the latter’s historic
bankruptcy scandal. See Alec Klein, Moody’s Board Members Have Ties to Clients, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 2004, at A09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles
/A3057-2004Nov21.html.
26
See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 70 (Robert E.
Litan & Yasuyuki Fuchita eds., 2006).
27
Id.

File: Voorhees 2

880

Created on: 6/7/2012 2:45:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/1/2012 6:08:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:875

Admittedly, the CRAs’ consulting services are miniscule compared with
their credit rating lines of business.28 However, it is questionable whether a
CRA can be an unbiased, objective observer under these circumstances.
B.

Little Accountability for Error

Another complaint about the Big Three is that the justice system
does not hold them accountable when they issue erroneous ratings, even
when they downgrade a company shortly before it declares bankruptcy.
Suits against CRAs regarding erroneous ratings have typically
failed at the earliest stages of litigation.29 Plaintiffs see their suits dismissed
because, among other things, CRAs enjoy extensive First Amendment
free-speech protection for those ratings that are freely distributed and
widely available to the public.30 The result is an “actual malice” standard
that few plaintiffs can prove before discovery.31 Courts tend to apply this
standard when the defendant CRA failed to issue a downgrade until shortly
before the client’s bankruptcy, as illustrated by the bankruptcies of Orange
County, CA and the now-defunct Enron Corporation.32
28

See, e.g., Moody’s Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 1, 2010). In 2009,
Moody’s received 71% of its revenues ($413.6 million) from issuer subscriptions to its “Research, Data, and Analytics” line of business, which provides credit ratings, industry studies,
and economic commentary. Id. In comparison, it received only about 25% ($145.1 million)
from selling risk management software and about 4% ($20.8 million) from professional
services such as personnel training. Id. Although the 71% number has declined from previous years, credit ratings consistently are the largest portion of the firm’s revenues. Id.
29
See, e.g., County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999); In re
Enron Corp. Sec., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
30
See Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation: Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises Hearing, 111th Cong. 4–6
(2009) (statement of Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Los
Angeles), available at www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/volokh.pdf (noting that in addition to the fact that ratings are “issues of public concern” because they are
widely available free of charge, ratings are not “commercial advertising,” a designation given
to business statements made for profit). The other major source of protection is the Securities
Act of 1933, which bars suit against CRAs unless there is a showing of fraud. The statute
does not provide similar protection to underwriters and accountants. See Jonathan S. Sack &
Stephen M. Juris, Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future, 238 N.Y.L.J., no. 88,
Nov. 5, 2007 at 2, available at http://www.maglaw.com/publications/data/00144/_res/id
=sa_File1/07011070002Morvillo.pdf (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2007)). Lastly,
CRAs can typically find refuge in industry standards and in plaintiffs’ difficulty pleading
causation. See Larry P. Ellsworth & Keith V. Porapaiboon, Credit Rating Agencies in the
Spotlight: A New Casualty of the Mortgage Meltdown, 18 BUS. L. TODAY, no. 4, Mar.–Apr.
2009 at 35, available at http://www.jenner.com/system/assets/publications/1926/original/
BLT_MA09_ellsworth.pdf?1314984199.
31
Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 30; New York Times v. Sullivan, 276 U.S. 254
(1964).
32
McGraw Hill, 245 B.R. at 153–54; Enron, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 810–11.
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In 1994, Orange County lost $500 million from poorly performing
bonds and subsequently declared bankruptcy.33 The county filed a $2 billion
suit against S&P regarding two groups of bonds, claiming that S&P failed to
accurately assess the bonds’ quality.34 The court held that because the
ratings were “matters of public concern,” Orange County must show that
S&P maliciously published the ratings.35 Orange County could not do so,
and the court granted summary judgment to S&P.36 Similarly, in the wake
of the 2001 Enron bankruptcy scandal, a Texas court applied the same freespeech protection to the Big Three’s faulty credit ratings of that company. 37
The court held that the ratings were matters of public concern and were not
published with actual malice, dismissing all charges against the CRAs.38
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shortly after the Enron
39
scandal. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act dramatically enhanced corporate
accountability and insider trading laws, it did not significantly address the
role of rating agencies in corporate scandals.40 CRAs emerged relatively
unscathed.
Recent court decisions, however, indicate that the CRAs’ freespeech protections might be eroding.41 Pension funds have filed many class
action suits against CRAs since 2008, alleging that CRAs misrepresent the
safety of bonds and then quickly downgrade them to below investment-

33

McGraw Hill, 245 B.R. at 155.
See id. at 153–54 (claiming breach of contract and professional negligence by S&P). To
be precise, Orange County actually sued McGraw Hill, the parent company of S&P. This
Note refers to the company as “S&P” for consistency.
35
Id. at 155.
36
Id. Interestingly, for the second issuance of bonds, S&P settled the case for a mere
$140,000 without admitting wrongdoing. The $140,000 figure was a small fraction of the
total settlement that Orange County obtained from other financial companies that played
other roles in the bankruptcy. See Michael B. Marois & William Selway, Merrill Vies for
Orange County Job a Decade After Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ataoEpOgwlRg (noting that other firms
settled their liability in the case for a total of over $860 million, including a $400 million
settlement by Merrill Lynch).
37
Enron, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
38
Id. at 833–36.
39
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
40
See Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235 (2003) (discussing the
increased scrutiny placed on corporate management and the eventual passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act following the Enron bankruptcy).
41
See Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, n.34 (2010) (describing recent suits brought by pension
funds against the major CRAs for ratings errors).
34
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grade status.42 Many of these cases are still in their infancy, but unlike
Orange County and Enron, courts have been hesitant to dismiss them before
trial.
In a recent case against S&P and Moody’s, a federal court held that
the First Amendment does not protect CRAs’ ratings of structured
investment vehicles.43 The court noted that the ratings provided to structured
investment vehicles were not publicly circulated, but rather that S&P and
Moody’s only provided them to a select group of investors.44 Similarly, a
court refused to dismiss an ongoing $6 billion suit by the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System for the same reason.45 While that case has
not yet reached the trial stage, it appears likely that the plaintiffs will
succeed on a negligence claim.46
C.

Connection Between Credit Ratings and Laws

A final concern is the connection between credit ratings and
substantive law, such as securities, banking, real estate, and insurance law.47
Incorporating credit ratings into the law distinguishes between safe and
unsafe investments, but it also conveys enormous power to existing CRAs,
especially the Big Three.48
In 1975, the SEC introduced the concept of the Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) and mandated that
any CRA referenced in a law must have the SEC’s NRSRO blessing.49

42

See id. (noting that one judge rejected the CRAs’ traditional First Amendment free
speech argument because the ratings were provided to a select group of institutional investors
rather than the public at large).
43
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 651 F. Supp. 2d. 155 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
44
Id.
45
See Alison Frankel, No Free-Speech Protection for Rating Agencies…Again: CA Judge,
REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/01/13/no-free-speechprotection-for-rating-agencies-again-ca-judge/ (discussing the defendants’ second failure to
dismiss the case on free-speech grounds).
46
See id.
47
Partnoy, supra note 26, at 82.
48
See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at The SEC
Speaks in 2009: In Search of Transparency, Accountability, and Competition: The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch020609klc.htm (addressing the unintended consequences of the regulatory use of
ratings. Commissioner Casey describes the NRSRO requirement as “a valuable franchise for
the large rating agencies [that] . . . innoculat[es] them from market competition.”).
49
See Partnoy, supra note 26, at 64 (noting that the first NRSRO requirement was for the
calculation of net capital requirements for broker-dealers).
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Private institutions quickly followed suit and adopted NRSRO standards in
their own contracts.50
The SEC issued no-action letters to applicant CRAs applying for
NRSRO status on a case-by-case system until 2006, when the agency
standardized the process.51 That treatment created an oligopoly situation
with high barriers to entry for small and new CRAs, which were unable to
acquire NRSRO status because of a “Catch-22” in the NRSRO application
process: a CRA needed to provide “generally accepted” ratings to become
an NRSRO, but few bond-issuing companies would actually do business
with CRAs that were not NRSROs.52 Thus, the system centralized power in
the largest CRAs, including the Big Three, and pushed small and new CRAs
out of the industry.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the past decade, and especially following the recent
financial crisis, policymakers worldwide have become cognizant of the
issues described above and have imposed a variety of regulations upon
CRAs. An examination of these oversight and accountability measures
follows.
A.

IOSCO’s Voluntary Compliance Regime

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
sets standards for international securities markets and is the primary forum
for the world’s securities agencies.53 IOSCO has broad jurisdiction and
authority, and its members account for more than 95% of the world’s
securities markets.54

50
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 103 (Viral V.
Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).
51
See The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies], available at http://www.sec.gov/news
/testimony/2007/ts092607cc.htm (describing the “no-action letter” process as one in which
the SEC would review information and documents to determine “whether the [CRA] had
achieved broad market acceptance for its ratings”).
52
See Casey, supra note 48 (imploring the SEC to remove regulatory requirements in SEC
rules as a means to eliminate overreliance on NRSRO ratings); see also Mark A. Calabria,
Did Deregulation Cause the Financial Crisis, 31 CATO POL’Y REP. 7–8 (2009) (describing
the unintended consequences of NRSRO registration requirements).
53
IOSCO Historical Background, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section
=background (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
54
Id.
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In 2003, IOSCO issued the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for
Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO Code).55 The IOSCO Code laid the
groundwork for each jurisdiction to implement its own regulatory system,
and its broad rules encourage widespread adoption by the CRAs’ many
member jurisdictions.56 For example, the IOSCO Code does not require
CRAs to adhere to a particular formula or methodology for their ratings, nor
does it provide for a mechanism to sanction.57 Instead, IOSCO left those
decisions to the policymakers in its various member jurisdictions.
Framing the IOSCO Code broadly ensured wide adoption by
CRAs.58 Many rating agencies have adopted some or all of the IOSCO
Code; the Big Three have adopted “substantial” portions.59
B.

Regulation in the U.S.

Currently, two laws regulate CRAs in the U.S.: the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 (“CRA Act”), which marked the first official
regulation of CRAs in the U.S., and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).60
The CRA Act defined the term “NRSRO” and standardized the
NRSRO application process.61 It also granted the SEC authority over CRA
55
Technical Comm., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO], Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies, IOSCO Doc. No. IOSCOPD180 (2004) [hereinafter IOSCO
Code], available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf (addressing three topics: (1) the quality and integrity of the rating process; (2) conflicts of interest;
and (3) CRA responsibilities to the investing public and issuers). For background material
regarding the IOSCO Code, see IOSCO, Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of
Credit Rating Agencies, IOSCO Doc. No. IOSCOPD151 (2003), available at https://www.
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf (proposing four high-level objectives to
address regarding CRAs: (1) the integrity of the rating process; (2) conflicts of interests; (3)
transparency; and (4) confidential information).
56
See External Credit Rating & Assessment Inst., Regulation: IOSCO Code of Conduct,
ECRAI, http://www.ecrai.eu/en/regulation/iosco_code_of_conduct.php (last visited Mar. 20,
2012) (outlining the history and purposes furthered by the IOSCO Code); IOSCO Code,
supra note 55.
57
External Credit Rating & Assessment Inst., supra note 56.
58
See IOSCO, A Review of Implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals
for Credit Rating Agencies, at 5, IOSCO Doc. No. IOSCOPD 286 (2009), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD286.pdf (“Because the IOSCO CRA
Code was designed for use by all CRAs, of all sizes and business models and operating under
a variety of legal systems, this review is not limited to just the largest CRAs.”).
59
Id. at 6.
60
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o–7 (2006)); Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
61
Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Pub. L. No.
109–291, § 4(a), 120 Stat. 1329 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)) (amending the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include various disclosure requirements for NRSRO
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recordkeeping requirements and reporting. As in the IOSCO Code, the
SEC’s new authority was limited to examinations, as the CRA Act
explicitly restricted the SEC from overseeing the “substance . . . or the
procedures and methodologies” of credit ratings.62 Most CRAs supported
the passage of the CRA Act because this limitation was present.63
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act marked a sweeping change to
financial law in the U.S.64 It subjects CRAs to substantial new authority
from the SEC’s new “Office of Credit Ratings,” which can fine
noncompliant CRAs.65 The Dodd-Frank Act also enables investors to sue
CRAs for errors in ratings, and it forces CRAs to publish their history of
correct and incorrect ratings.66 It also enhances disclosure requirements
regarding methodologies and track record of incorrect ratings.67 Lastly, the
Dodd-Frank Act addresses conflicts of interest for compliance officers and
NRSRO board members, addresses the ties between ratings and laws, and
enables the SEC to deregister NRSROs that frequently provide incorrect
ratings.68
One notable feature about the Dodd-Frank Act is that it does not
propose a government clearinghouse to randomly assign work to the various
CRAs.69 The Franken Amendment, drafted by Minnesota Senator Al
applications, as well as requiring that all NRSRO application be made public by the applicant
CRA); id. at § 2(4) (finding that oversight of CRAs “serves the compelling interest of investor protection”).
62
Id. at 1332; see also Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 51.
63
See FRANK PARTNOY, RETHINKING REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: AN
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 6 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/
file/CRAWhitePaper04-14-09.pdf (noting that the major CRAs approved of the CRA Act
because it was so narrowly tailored).
64
See generally Dodd-Frank Act; SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP &
AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS (2010) (outlining the major
highlights of the Dodd-Frank Act, including oversight and systemic risk, financial institutions, capital markets, corporate governance and compensation, and consumer issues). At the
signing of the Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama stated that Congress overcame “the furious
lobbying of an array of powerful interest groups.” Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President at Signing of Frank-Dodd Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July
21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentsigning-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act.
65
Dodd-Frank Act § 931-67; see also U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform: Conference Summary, http://banking.senate.
gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Fin
al.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) (providing a concise summary of the Dodd-Frank Act).
66
Dodd-Frank Act § 932.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
John Hunt, Senate Passes Tough Rating-Agency Amendments, CREDIT RATING AGENCY
LAW BLOG (May 13, 2010), http://ratingagencylawblog.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/frankenand-lemieux-amendments/.
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Franken, presented this concern and proposed a randomized system
intended to prevent companies from “shopping around” for favorable
ratings.70 However, the Senate referred the issue to an SEC study that could
take several years to finish.71 Based upon the intensely negative public
reaction by the CRAs to the Franken Amendment, many speculate that
rating-agency lobbyists had a hand in this decision.72 Aside from this
speculation, however, many observers believe that the passage of the DoddFrank Act is a bold, successful new step that will restore confidence in the
financial system and in CRAs.73
The CRA and Dodd-Frank Acts have prompted significant changes
in the ratings industry. In particular, the SEC’s new ability to fine
noncompliant CRAs will likely enhance adherence to SEC regulations.
C.

Regulation in Europe

Until September 2009, CRAs operating in the E.U. did not report to
any formal authority other than the voluntary IOSCO compliance regime.74
At that time, the European Parliament adopted the Regulation on Credit
Rating Agencies (E.U. Regulation), significantly surpassing IOSCO’s
voluntary baseline requirements.75
70

See David M. Herszenhorn, House-Senate Talks Drop New Rules for Credit Raters,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/business
/16regulate.html.
71
See id. (remarking that conference negotiations between the House and Senate removed
the randomization requirement to study the conflict-of-interest issue).
72
See Ben Hallman, Credit Rating Agencies Most Worried About Liability, IWATCH NEWS
(June 16, 2010), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2010/06/16/2645/credit-rating-agencies-mostworried-about-liability ("The industry is dominated by Moody’s Corp., Standard & Poor’s
Financial Services, and Fitch Ratings Inc, which collectively spent more than $1 million on
financial reform legislation-related lobbyists in the first three months of 2010, according to a
Center analysis of lobbying data.”). The rating agencies bristled at the Franken Amendment.
An S&P spokesman advised that the amendment would reduce competition and innovation
by “lead[ing] to more homogenized rating opinions and, ultimately, depriv[ing] investors of
valuable, differentiated opinions on credit risk.” Kevin Drawbaugh & Andy Sullivan, Senate
Wall Street Reform Bill Hits Credit Raters, REUTERS (May 13, 2010), http://www. reuters.com/article/idUSWAT01445120100513.
73
See SKADDEN, ARPS ET AL., supra note 64.
74
See Siegfried Utzig, The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies:
A European Banking Perspective 8 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 188, 2010),
available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.01.26.wp188.credit.rating.agencies.european.
banking.pdf (“Before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the regulatory setup in Europe was
based mainly on self-regulation within certain supervisory ‘crash barriers’ in the form of the
IOSCO Code.”).
75
See Council Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1-31 (EC) (turning voluntary
reporting into mandatory reporting); see also Parliament Backs Tighter Rules for Rating
Agencies, EURACTIV (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services
/parliament-backs-tighter-rules-rating-agencies/article-181579 (emphasizing that the E.U.
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The E.U. Regulation is similar to U.S. regulation with respect to
registration and recordkeeping requirements.76 However, the E.U.
Regulation also implicitly allows European regulators to impose
methodological requirements upon CRAs.77 Further, it implements an
“endorsement or certification” restriction that requires foreign CRAs to
either receive the endorsement of a domestic CRA or to become certified in
that jurisdiction.78 Due to this restriction, it is possible that fewer CRAs will
operate in the E.U. going forward.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
As discussed above, regulators in the U.S. and the E.U. have begun
to address industry problems. While it is still quite early to criticize either
approach, this Section presents alternative solutions that regulators could
adopt in lieu of or in addition to their current efforts. Two options are the
creation of an international oversight and accountability board and the
creation of publicly owned rating agencies.
A.

International Oversight and Accountability Board

Credit rating agencies, issuers, and investors currently face the
difficult challenge of navigating divergent regulatory systems. The
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), through its
Credit Rating Agency Task Force, suggested that creating an international
oversight and accountability board could ameliorate this challenge.79
SIFMA proposed that a well-respected international body could command
Regulation imposes more stringent rules than the IOSCO guidelines upon CRAs). The E.U.
made this decision based on advice from the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR) and the European Securities Market Expert Group (ESME). Id.
76
See Kristina St. Charles, Note, Regulatory Imperialism: The Worldwide Export of European Regulatory Principles on Credit Rating Agencies, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 399, 417 (2010)
(listing the EU Regulation’s detailed provisions).
77
See Council Regulation 1060/2009, art. 8; see also St. Charles, supra note 76, at 425
(discussing the impact of the EU regulations on CRAs and international financing opportunities).
78
See Council Regulation 1060/2009, arts. 4–5 (providing procedures for issuance of
credit ratings and guidelines for using credit ratings from agencies in third countries); see
also Utzig, supra note 74, at 15–16 (describing the key points of the Regulation); St. Charles,
supra note 76, at 419–27 (describing the endorsement and certification process in the EU);
Credit Rating Agencies, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market
/single_market_services/financial_services_transactions_in_securities/mi0009_en.htm (last
updated Sept. 2, 2011) (highlighting the methods to approve credit ratings issued outside of
the EU).
79
SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SIFMA CREDIT RATING AGENCY TASK FORCE 11 (2008), available at http://www.sifma
.org/news/news.aspx?id=6594.
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oversight functions and that a wide array of investors, underwriters, and
bond issuers could staff the advisory board.80 The board would perform
functions such as advising lawmakers and companies, developing CRA
guidelines and best practices, and disclosing information.81
An oversight and accountability board could potentially have
significant benefits over the current system. Standardizing the ratings
process across jurisdictions would create economies of scale and would
eliminate costly inter-jurisdictional analyses. It would also be easier for
CRAs and investors to understand and adapt to the uniform framework.
Bond issuers could benefit from lower fees as well.
This approach would have disadvantages as well, such as funding
the board and persuading multiple countries to agree to a uniform plan.
Each country would bring its own strategic considerations to the table, and
compromising on details could prove difficult. For example, the U.S. would
probably insist that it retain special authority over the Big Three, all of
which are headquartered within its jurisdiction.
By the time that a permanent solution is agreed upon, the global
financial situation could change entirely. However, it would be useful to
begin multilateral discussions and explore in greater detail the opportunities
that this proposal presents.
B.

Public Rating Agencies

Another option exists at the national level: implementing public
rating agencies to compete with the existing private rating agencies.
Lawmakers in the E.U. considered this idea in 2010, when E.U. Internal
Market Commissioner Michel Barnier suggested that creating an E.U. rating
agency would increase competition among the Big Three.82
There would of course be significant difficulties and unintended
consequences to this approach. For example, lawmakers would need to
restrict political pressure from influencing the public CRA, and they would
need to ensure that the public CRA is independent from its government
regulators. Additionally, they would need to determine the costeffectiveness of this approach.
With these challenges in mind, lawmakers should continue to
explore the public CRA as a method to loosen the oligopoly status of the
existing CRAs, especially the Big Three. While the expense to the public
80

Id.
Id. at 11–12 (describing the major functions such a board would conduct, including
advising lawmakers, serving as a global forum for regulatory approaches, promoting consistent guidelines and best practices for CRAs, and disclosing information for the public).
82
Kyle James, E.U. Eyes Tougher Regulation for Credit Rating Agencies, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6196208,00.html.
81
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CRA approach may be significant, lawmakers should consider the price of
another financial crisis. Ultimately, implementing this approach would
require a deep examination of the role of the government in private markets.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent financial crisis has caused long-term damage and lasting
effects to the global financial system. Credit rating agencies contributed to
the crisis by giving their highest ratings to poorly understood new financial
instruments. They played an enabling role in the boom of the housing
market, and later, they exacerbated the financial meltdown by quickly
downgrading investments worth billions to below investment-grade status.
All the while, they lacked significant accountability and oversight and
suffered from intense conflicts of interest.
Regulators in the U.S. and in the E.U. have begun to take action. In
the U.S., the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and the Dodd-Frank Act
now address inappropriate CRA practices, and the SEC can now fine
noncompliant CRAs. Multiple class action lawsuits are progressing to trial.
In the E.U., European regulators now enjoy many of the same regulatory
capabilities as their American counterparts, and they also have power over
the methodologies that CRAs use.
Although lawmakers have already taken substantial steps, they
could explore additional options at the international and national level. An
international advisory board could promote uniformity and compliance
across jurisdictions, and introducing public CRAs could increase
competition in the marketplace and weaken the oligopoly that the Big Three
currently enjoy.
Party politics, lobbyists and special interests must not dissuade
legislators as they continue to address CRA practices. Regulators must
vigilantly ensure that the investment community and the public maintain
confidence in credit rating agencies. The international financial system
survived the recent financial crisis, but it may not be able to survive another.

